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Cross-border Effects of Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms: The Swiss Case

In this article, cross-border effects of different market design options are analyzed using Switzerland, which is strongly interconnected to larger neighboring markets, as a case study. An investigation is conducted with an agent-based model where in one scenario, all market designs are represented according to the current legislation, and in another, energy-only markets (EOM) are assumed in all considered countries. The results show that wholesale electricity prices are highly dependent on the chosen market design and in the annual average are up to 27% higher in the EOM scenario. Due to expected larger interconnector capacities, this increase is evident in all simulated markets. Furthermore, the results indicate that the planned market design changes in the neighboring countries decrease investments in Switzerland. However, generation adequacy is still guaranteed due to the high Swiss hydropower storage capacity. Our results suggest that, under the current circumstances, a domestic mechanism in Switzerland is not required.

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Keywords: Capacity remuneration mechanisms, Cross-border effects, Electricity market coupling, Generation adequacy, Switzerland, Agent-based modeling

DOI: 10.5547/01956574.42.2.fzim

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Published in Volume 42, Number 2 of the bi-monthly journal of the IAEE's Energy Economics Education Foundation.


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