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The Political Economy of a Carbon Price Floor for Power Generation

David M. Newbery, David M. Reiner, and Robert A. Ritz

Year: 2019
Volume: Volume 40
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.40.1.dnew
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Abstract:
The EU carbon price lies well below estimates of the social cost of carbon and "target-consistent" carbon prices needed to deliver ambitious targets such as the 40% reduction target for 2030. In light of this, the UK introduced a carbon price floor (CPF) for its electricity sector in 2013 and the new Dutch Government has recently made a similar commitment, while successive French Governments have called for an EU-wide CPF. This paper analyzes the impacts and design of a power-sector CPF, both at the EU and national level, using a political-economy approach. We find a good case for introducing such a price-based instrument into the EU ETS. We suggest that a CPF should be designed to "top up" the EUA price to �25-30/tCO2, rising annually at 3-5% above inflation, at least until 2030. We argue that the new EU Market Stability Reserve enhances the value of a CPF in terms of delivering climate benefits, and discuss the potential for a regional CPF in North-West Europe. We also review international policy experience with price floors (and ceilings).



A Strategic Perspective on Competition between Pipeline Gas and LNG

Robert A. Ritz

Year: 2019
Volume: Volume 40
Number: Number 5
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.40.5.rrit
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Abstract:
Global gas markets feature two types of suppliers: piped gas and LNG exporters. Pipelines have a high degree of "asset specificity" : once built, they are physically bound to a particular route. LNG is transported by tanker, with a choice of export markets. Put simply: LNG is mobile, pipelines are not. This paper uses game-theoretic modelling to show how its commitment to serving a single market confers a strategic advantage on piped gas. By "overinvesting" in its own market, a pipeline exporter can induce LNG rivals to shift sales to their other markets. The model helps understand competition between Russian piped gas and Qatari LNG. It shows how Russia's dependence on Europe can be good news for gas buyers, why these nonetheless strongly benefit from diversifying into LNG imports, and how the Herfindahl index of imports can mismeasure "supply security" . The paper also discusses Russia's evolving gas export strategy, including gas deals with China.



Strategic Behaviour in a Capacity Market? The New Irish Electricity Market Design

Juha Teirilä and Robert A. Ritz

Year: 2019
Volume: Volume 40
Number: The New Era of Energy Transition
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.40.SI1.jtei
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Abstract:
The transition to a low-carbon power system requires growing the share of generation from (intermittent) renewables while ensuring security of supply. Policymakers and economists increasingly see a capacity mechanism as a way to deal with this challenge. Yet this raises new concerns about the exercise of market power by large players via the capacity auction. We present a new modelling approach that captures such strategic behaviour together with a set of ex ante empirical estimates for the new Irish electricity market design (I-SEM) - in which a single firm controls 44% of generation capacity (excluding wind). We find significant costs of strategic behaviour, even with new entry: In our baseline scenarios, procurement costs in the capacity auction are around 150-400 million EUR (or 40-100%) above the competitive least-cost solution. From a policy perspective, we also examine how market power can be measured and mitigated through auction design.



Optimal Capacity Mechanisms for Competitive Electricity Markets

Pär Holmberg and Robert A. Ritz

Year: 2020
Volume: Volume 41
Number: Special Issue
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.41.SI1.phol
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Abstract:
Capacity mechanisms are increasingly used in electricity market design around the world yet their role remains hotly debated. This paper introduces a new benchmark model of a capacity mechanism in a competitive electricity market with many different conventional generation technologies. We consider two policy instruments, a wholesale price cap and a capacity payment, and show which combinations of these instruments induce socially-optimal investment by the market. Our analysis yields a rationale for a capacity mechanism based on the internalization of a system-cost externality�even where the price cap is set at the value of lost load. In extensions, (i) we show how increasing variable renewables penetration can enhance the need for a capacity payment under a novel condition called "imperfect system substitutability" , and (ii) we outline the socially-optimal design of a strategic reserve with a targeted capacity payment.





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