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The Power Equipment Industry in Transition

Augusto Ninni

Year: 1992
Volume: Volume 13
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol13-No3-6
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Abstract:
This paper deals with the expected effects of the EEC Commission decision to open up EEC public procurement markets within the Single Market initiative. These effects are viewed on the behavior of European utilities and on the power equipment supplying sector. Both price and non-price effects are analyzed. The new market configuration should require a new kind of supplier, able to add the advantages of being "domestic" to the advantages of being part of a large, transnational group. Thus, such an institutional initiative can explain a large part of the general turmoil which hit the international power equipment industry in the late 1980s. However, the increasing concentration of the supply sector-also stimulated in part by the success of gas turbine technology-reduces the expectation that EEC utilities will take advantage of the opening up of their procurement markets, at least in terms of lower equipmentprices.



Trading in the Downstream European Gas Market: A Successive Oligopoly Approach

Maroeska G. Boots, Fieke A.M. Rijkers and Benjamin F. Hobbs

Year: 2004
Volume: Volume 25
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol25-No3-5
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Abstract:
A model of successive oligopoly is applied to the European natural gas market. The model has a two-level structure, in which Cournot producers are also Stackelberg leaders with respect to traders, who may be Cournot oligopolists or price takers. Several conclusions emerge. First, successive oligopoly ("double marginalization") yields higher prices and lower consumer welfare than if oligopoly exists only on one level. Second, due to the high concentration of traders, prices are distorted more by market power in trading than in production. Third, trader profits depend on whether producers can price discriminate among consuming sectors; if so, producers collect a greater share of the profits. Finally, when traders increase in number, prices approach competitive levels. Thus, it is important to prevent concentration in the downstream gas market. If oligopolistic trading cannot be prevented, vertical integration should not be discouraged, especially if it would increase the number of traders.



The More Cooperation, The More Competition? A Cournot Analysis of the Benefits of Electric Market Coupling

Benjamin F. Hobbs, Fieke A.M. Rijkers, Maroeska G. Boots

Year: 2005
Volume: Volume 26
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol26-No4-5
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Abstract:
If barriers between two power markets are eliminated, what might happen to competition and prices? And who benefits? In the case of the Belgian and Dutch markets, market coupling would permit more efficient use of transmission by improving access to the Belgian market, by counting only net flows against interface limits, and by eliminating mismatches in timing of interface auctions and energy spot markets. We estimate the benefits associated with the first two of these impacts using a transmission-constrained Cournot model. Social surplus improvements on the order of 108 �/year are projected, unless market coupling encourages the largest producer in the region to switch from price-taking in Belgium to a Cournot strategy due to a perceived diminished threat of regulatory intervention. Whether Dutch consumers would benefit also depends on that company�s behavior. The results illustrate how large-scale oligopoly models can be used to assess changes in market designs.



Supply Function Equilibrium with Asymmetric Capacities and Constant Marginal Costs

Par Holmberg

Year: 2007
Volume: Volume 28
Number: Number 2
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol28-No2-3
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Abstract:
This paper analytically derives a Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) of a real-time electricity market with multiple firms and asymmetric production capacities. There is a unique SFE, which is piece-wise symmetric when firms have identical constant marginal costs. It is believed that some of the properties of the derived SFE are valid for real-time markets in general. Firms� capacity constraints bind at different prices (i). Still, firms with non-binding capacity constraints have smooth residual demand (ii). Approximating an asymmetric real-time market with a symmetric one, tends to overestimate mark-ups for small positive imbalances and underestimate mark-ups for large positive imbalances (iii).



An Oligopolistic Electricity Market Model with Interdependent Segments

Pierre-Olivier Pineau and Georges Zaccour

Year: 2007
Volume: Volume 28
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol28-No3-9
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Abstract:
In this paper,we model a two-period electricity market with interdependent demand, where oligopolistic generators make investments in peak-and base-load capacities. Different prices are obtained in the two periods, and residential consumers can react to prices across demand periods. We characterize the Cournot equilibrium obtained as a function of price and cross-price effects and present a numerical illustration based on the Ontario (Canada) electricity market.



Strategic Forward Contracting in the Wholesale Electricity Market

Pär Holmberg

Year: 2011
Volume: Volume 32
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol32-No1-7
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Abstract:
This paper analyses a wholesale electricity market with supply function competition. Trade in the forward and spot markets is represented by a two-stage game, and its subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is characterized. It is verified that increased forward sales of a producer constitute a credible commitment to aggressive spot market bidding. The paper identifies market situations when this pro-competitive commitment is unilaterally profitable for the producer. It is also proven that a producer has incentives to sell in the forward market in order to reduce competitors' forward sales, which softens their spot market offers.



A Dynamic Oligopolistic Electricity Market with Interdependent Market Segments

Pierre-Olivier Pineau, Hasina Rasata, and Georges Zaccour

Year: 2011
Volume: Volume 32
Number: Number 4
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol32-No4-9
View Abstract

Abstract:
We propose a deterministic, discrete-time, finite-horizon oligopoly model to investigate investment and production equilibrium strategies, in a setting where demand evolves over time and the two market-segment loads (peak-and base-load) are interdependent. The players (generators) compete a` la Cournot, open-loop Nash equilibria are computed and numerical results are discussed. The model is calibrated with data from Ontario, Canada. We assess the impact on equilibrium strategies of a generation sector with more market power than what is actually the case. We also find a slight difference in the investment sequence when interdependent demand segments are considered. Finally, we analyze the impact of increasing demand elasticities over time, and varying the financial values of the production capacities that remain at the end of the planning horizon. We believe that such a tool is valuable for professionals and scholars interested in the dynamics of production capacity mix (portfolio of technologies) in the electricity sector. It is also of paramount importance for public decision makers who have to simultaneously deal with environmental issues and with price control, both of which are politically sensitive.



Nonlinear Pricing and Tariff Differentiation: Evidence from the British Electricity Market

Stephen Davies, Catherine Waddams Price, and Chris M. Wilson

Year: 2014
Volume: Volume 35
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.35.1.4
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Abstract:
Liberalisation of the British household electricity market, in which previously monopolised regional markets were exposed to large-scale entry, is used as a natural experiment on oligopolistic nonlinear pricing. Each oligopolist offered a single two-part electricity tariff, but inconsistent with current theory, the two-part tariffs were heterogeneous in ways that cannot be attributed to explanations such as asymmetric costs or variations in brand loyalty. Instead, the evidence suggests that firms deliberately differentiated their tariff structures, resulting in market segmentation according to consumers' usage.



Comparison of Incentive Policies for Renewable Energy in an Oligopolistic Market with Price-Responsive Demand

Miguel Pérez de Arce and Enzo Sauma

Year: 2016
Volume: Volume 37
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.37.3.mdea
View Abstract

Abstract:
This article compares different incentive policies to encourage the development of renewable energy (RE). These incentive policies (carbon tax, feed-in tariff, premium payment and quota system) are modeled in a simplified radial power network, using price-responsive demand. Most results are derived assuming an oligopolistic Cournot competitive framework and that the costs of subsidies are covered by the government (i.e., customers do not directly pay back for the subsidies). We compare the different RE incentive schemes at different congestion levels in terms of energy prices, RE generation, CO2 emissions, and social welfare. We find that the effectiveness of the different incentive schemes varies significantly depending on the market structure assumed, the costs of renewable energy, and the subsidy recovery method considered. Subsidy policies (FIT and premium payments) are more cost effective in reducing CO2 emissions than those policies that apply penalties or taxes, when assuming oligopoly competition and that customers do not directly pay back for the subsidies. Quota and carbon tax policies are more cost effective when assuming that either a perfectly competitive electricity market takes place or customers directly pay back for the subsidies. Additionally, we show that, in the feed-in tariff system, there is an interaction among incentive levels for renewable energy technologies. Given a certain feed-in tariff price to be set for a particular renewable technology, this price influences the optimal feed-in tariff price to be set for another technology.



Competition in Electricity Markets with Renewable Energy Sources

Daron Acemoglu, Ali Kakhbod, and Asuman Ozdaglar

Year: 2017
Volume: Volume 38
Number: KAPSARC Special Issue
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.38.SI1.dace
View Abstract

Abstract:
This paper studies the effects of the diversification of energy portfolios on the merit order effect in an oligopolistic energy market. The merit order effect describes the negative impact of renewable energy, typically supplied at the low marginal cost, to the electricity market. We show when thermal generators have a diverse energy portfolio, meaning that they also control some or all of the renewable supplies, they offset the price declines due to the merit order effect because they strategically reduce their conventional energy supplies when renewable supply is high. In particular, when all renewable supply generates profits for only thermal power generators this offset is complete - meaning that the merit order effect is totally neutralized. As a consequence, diversified energy portfolios may be welfare reducing. These results are robust to the presence of forward contracts and incomplete information (with or without correlated types). We further use our full model with incomplete information to study the volatility of energy prices in the presence of intermittent and uncertain renewable supplies.




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